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Abstract
In April 2004, the European Union adopted a new legislative frame-
work for genetically modified (GM) organisms. This framework reg-
ulates the placing on the market of GM products, and demands
these products to be labeled as such. We present a duopoly model
with vertical differentiation and mandatory labeling, where one firm
produces a GM product and the other produces the conventional
product. We assume the GM product to have lower marginal cost,
and lower value to consumers. We analyze the effects of introduc-
ing the GM good on output, prices, and welfare. We also study
contamination and costly testing of conventional goods.
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1 Introduction
In April 2004, the European Union (EU) adopted a new legislative frame-
work for genetically modified (GM) organisms. This framework regulates
the placing on the market of GM products (food, feed, and seed), and de-
mands these products to be labeled as such. Labeling is mandatory for all
food products produced from GM organisms irrespective of whether traces
of these can be found in the final product, and for all GM feed and seed.1
Generally, the most important argument in favor of adopting GM technol-
ogy is that it greatly enhances crop yield, by reducing crop loss due to pests
(see e.g. Ulph and O’Shea, 2002). Other benefits include reduced labor
requirements and greater planting flexibility (Saak and Hennessy, 2002).
Thus, overall, GM technology allows for more efficient plant breeding. Sev-
eral authors present estimates of the gains from adoption of GM products.
For example, Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a, 2000b) estimate the total increase
in world surplus from the introduction of a GM type of cotton and analyze
the distribution of the total surplus over developer, farmers, consumers,
and others. Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a) also present a similar analysis for
herbicide-tolerant GM soybeans. Their results indicate that the introduc-
tion of these GM products has increased welfare. A more general study
by Lence and Hayes (2002) uses a market simulation model to estimate
the effects of introducing GM crops on societal welfare. They show that in
the long run, when supply can be adjusted to meet demand, welfare will
almost always rise. Ulph and O’Shea (2002) present a theoretical analysis
of optimal government policy with respect to research and development of
GM products, focusing on the effects on biodiversity. In general, the issue
1For details, see the press releases of the European Commission (2003, 2004). See
also Economist.com (2004).
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of biodiversity itself has attracted quite some attention in the economic
literature (see e.g. Brock and Xepapadeas, 2003, and references therein).
The only theoretical analysis of the effects of the adoption of GM products
on competition that we are aware of is the paper by Munro (2003), who
presents a model of crop production. Munro focuses on the possibility of
predation by the firm producing the GM product, resulting in monopoliza-
tion, and corresponding welfare implications. In our view, although GM
products may drive conventional products from the market in the long run,
the outcome of monopolization seems somewhat extreme, at least for the
short to medium run. Therefore, we choose to focus on the situation where
the GM version and the conventional version of the same product coexist
and compete with each other.
To analyze the effects of the introduction of GM products and the asso-
ciated mandatory labeling2 on competition,3 we study a duopoly model
with vertical differentiation4 and mandatory labeling, where one firm pro-
duces a GM product and the other produces the conventional version of
the product. We assume the GM product to have lower marginal cost
of production, and lower quality, i.e. lower value to consumers.5 Label-
ing ensures that consumers know the quality of the products. We analyze
2For a discussion of mandatory labeling of GM foods and why this may lead to no
GM products on the retail market, see Carter and Grue`re (2003).
3We totally abstract from other important issues in the debate on GM organisms,
such as ethical, health-related, and environmental concerns.
4Amacher et al. (2004) use a related model to describe competition with eco-labeling
and investment in ‘clean’ technologies. However, they simplify the competition stage
(assuming full market coverage) and focus on firms’ incentives to invest.
5Note that this setup is mainly relevant for many GM food and feed products. It may
not be so for seeds, since GM seeds may actually be of higher quality, and perhaps more
costly to produce than non-GM seeds. For food, we assume that even though inputs like
seeds may be more expensive, this is outweighed by the benefits of the GM technology,
and overall marginal cost falls.
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the effects of introducing the GM product on output, prices, and welfare
by comparing the results of this model to those of a benchmark model in
which both firms produce the conventional product. In practice, if GM
products are produced conventional products may become contaminated
(during cultivation, harvest, transport, or processing). According to the
new EU legislative framework ‘conventional’ products have to be tested
and labeled as GM product if the presence of GM material in the product
exceeds a certain threshold. Therefore, we also study the effects of con-
tamination and costly testing of the conventional product for traces of GM
organisms.6
We find some surprising results. For example, it is commonly believed
that GM technology will cause prices of conventional products to rise, but
we show that the price of the conventional product may actually fall after
the introduction of the GM product. Also, the increased choice set with
GM products is commonly thought to benefit consumers, but we show
that consumer surplus may fall after the introduction of the GM product.
However, in our model, whenever the GM firm finds it optimal to indeed
introduce the GM product (i.e. this firm’s profits rise), social welfare will
rise. Further, we show that contamination may actually raise welfare, and
costly testing does not only raise the price of the conventional product, but
also that of the GM product.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
benchmark duopoly model which describes competition before the intro-
duction of the GM version of the product, so where both firms produce the
6Another important issue in the new EU legislative framework is that of traceability,
that is, the transmitting and retaining of information concerning the presence of GM
organisms in a product at each stage of production. We abstract from this in our
analysis. However, our marginal cost parameter can be reinterpreted as including the
costs of transmission and storage of information for traceability purposes.
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conventional product. Section 3 presents the model with the GM version
of the product produced by one of the two firms, and mandatory labeling.
We also include the possibility of contamination in this model. Section 4
presents the main results for the case without contamination. In section 5
we address contamination and testing of the conventional product. Section
6 concludes.
2 The benchmark model
Our analysis starts with a description of competition before the introduction
of the GM version of the product. For expositional convenience, we assume
that there is no differentiation at this stage. This assumption will be relaxed
in the next section, when the GM product is introduced. There, we will
focus on vertical differentiation - thus, we abstract from any horizontal
differentiation.
2.1 Setup of the benchmark model
We consider a simple linear Cournot model. Suppose there are two firms,
indexed i = 1, 2, who both produce the conventional product and compete
in quantities.7 Both firms produce the same quality of the product, at the
same level of marginal cost, denoted by c, 0 < c < 1. Let the quantity
demanded at a given price p be Q (p) = 1 − p. Then inverse demand is
given by p = 1− q1− q2, where qi denotes the quantity produced by firm i,
i = 1, 2.
7This assumption corresponds to that of price competition with capacity constraints
(Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). We take this to be closer to reality for most food and
feed products than pure price competition.
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2.2 Solution of the benchmark model
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the simple model described above can be
derived as follows. Firm i’s profits are
pii = qi (1− q1 − q2 − c) ,
and the first-order condition (FOC) for profit maximization of firm i is
given by
1− 2qi − qj − c = 0,
i = 1, 2, i = j. Solving the two FOCs simultaneously, we find equilibrium









where the subscript B refers to the benchmark model. For completeness,
















(θ − c) dθ = 4
9
(
1− 2c+ c2) .
8In the integrand, θ corresponds to the parameter θ that will be defined in section 3.
This is because the benchmark model is just a simplified version of the general model
discussed there.
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3 The model with GM products and label-
ing
Now suppose that one firm, say firm 1, has decided to produce a GM
version of the product rather than the conventional version. The other firm,
firm 2, continues to produce the conventional product. GM products are
generally seen as (weakly) inferior goods (see e.g. Saak and Hennessy, 2002).
For expositional convenience, we assume that all consumers consider the
GM product as strictly inferior, i.e. as lower quality than the conventional
product. Thus, we have a duopoly model with vertical differentiation now
(see e.g. Tirole, 1988, pp. 296-298).
3.1 Setup of the model
To model the different quality levels of the two products, denote by s the
quality (‘number of quality units’) of a product. For simplicity, we nor-
malize the quality of the conventional product, produced by firm 2, to
1. The quality of the GM product, produced by firm 1, is denoted by
sGM . We assume sGM < 1 - the GM product is considered inferior. Fur-
ther, marginal cost of the conventional product (firm 2) continues to be c,
whereas marginal cost of the GM product (firm 1) is now given by cGM
with cGM < c and 0 < cGM < sGM .
We have a continuum of consumers. Each consumer demands either one or
zero units of (the GM or conventional version of) the product. Consumers’





if the consumer consumes 1 unit of quality s at price p;
otherwise.
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An individual consumer is characterized by his value of the parameter θ,
which denotes the consumer’s taste for quality. We assume θ to be uni-
formly distributed on the interval [0, 1].9
As we explained in the introduction, if GM products are produced the con-
ventional products may become contaminated and contain traces of GM
organisms. Therefore, the conventional product may need to be tested.
Testing itself is costly, say it raises marginal cost by an amount of t, t ≥ 0.
If the test shows that there is too much contamination, a ‘conventional’
product will be labeled as GM product. The mandatory labeling does not
distinguish between products that are wilfully produced as GM products,
and contaminated products. Thus, consumers do not treat the contami-
nated product as a conventional, high-quality product, but as a GM, low-
quality product. We model this as follows. Assume that a fraction ρ,
ρ ∈ [0, 1), of firm 2’s output q2 will be contaminated.10 To consumers, this
share of firm 2’s output has quality sGM rather than 1. The remainder, an
amount (1− ρ) q2, does have quality 1.
In addition, we make the following assumptions. First, we assume that
both firms face strictly positive demand in the equilibrium of our model
— we do not aim to study the situation in which the market for one of
the two versions of the product collapses. The consumer who is indifferent
between buying a GM or a non-GM product is located at θˆ, with θˆ defined
by θˆsGM − pGM = θˆ − pN , where the subscript N refers to the non-GM or
9It can easily be verified that the benchmark model discussed in section 2 can be
derived from this general model by setting the quality as well as the marginal cost level
of firm 1 equal to that of firm 2, i.e. both firms have quality s = 1 and marginal cost
c < 1.
10For simplicity, we do not take into account uncertainty in our model. However, in





1− sGM . (1)
The consumer who is indifferent between buying a GM product or nothing





Assumption 1 Both firms face strictly positive demand, that is, 0 ≤ θ <
θˆ < 1.
Further, we suggested above that firm 1 produces the GM version of the
product, whereas firm 2 continues to produce the conventional product.
For reasons of consistency, and in order to be able to interpret product or
quality choice as endogenous, we impose the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 If firm 2 produces the conventional version of the product,
firm 1 is better off producing the GM version. That is, firm 1’s equilibrium
profits pi∗1 (to be derived below) are greater than or equal to the benchmark
equilibrium profits pi∗B.
Assumption 3 Firm 2 does not produce the GM version of the product,
for one of the following reasons:
(i) the GM technology is not available to firm 2;
(ii) if firm 1 produces the GM version of the product, firm 2 is better
off producing the conventional version. That is, firm 2’s equilibrium
profits pi∗2 (to be derived below) are smaller than the equilibrium profits
when both firms produce the GM version.
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It turns out that the latter assumption does not qualitatively affect our
results. For that reason, we can ignore the restriction on the parameters
imposed by Assumption 3(ii) in most of the analysis below. Assumption 3(i)
can be interpreted as follows. Firm 2 may simply not be able to produce
the GM version of the product because firm 1 has a patent on the GM
input or technology; because firm 1 was the only firm who engaged in or
was successful at R&D on GM technology; or because the supplier of the
GM input engages in selective distribution and supplies to firm 1 only. Note
that any investment in GM technology is treated as sunk, whether it was
done by the supplier of the GM input, by firm 1, or by both firms. We
abstract from modeling the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D; instead, we
focus on competition issues and welfare.
3.2 Solution of the model
In order to solve this model, we first derive demand. Note that firm 1’s
output will be labeled as GM, but so will a fraction ρ of firm 2’s output,
which does not pass the test. Consumers treat all labeled products in the
same way, i.e. as quality sGM . So in deriving demand, we should focus
on GM versus non-GM (conventional) products, rather than on firm 1’s
products versus firm 2’s products.
Using Assumption 1, both versions of the product face positive demand,
and we can write the quantities demanded as





qN = 1− θˆ = 1− pN − pGM
1− sGM .
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Rewriting yields inverse demand functions
pGM = (1− qGM − qN) sGM ,
pN = (1− qGM − qN) + qM (1− sGM)
= 1− qGMsGM − qN .
The firms’ decision variables, however, are not qGM and qN , but q1 and q2.
Evidently, we have qGM = q1 + ρq2 and qN = (1− ρ) q2. Thus, firm 1’s
profits are
pi1 = q1 (pGM − cGM)
= q1 ((1− q1 − q2) sGM − cGM) ,
and firm 2’s profits are
pi2 = q2 ((1− ρ) pN + ρpGM − c− t)
= q2 (1− sGMq1 − q2 − c− t+ ρ (1− sGM) ((2− ρ) q2 − 1)) .
The corresponding FOCs are given by
(1− 2q1 − q2) sGM − cGM = 0, (3)
and
1− sGMq1 − 2q2 − c− t+ ρ (1− sGM) (2 (2− ρ) q2 − 1) = 0, (4)
and they imply that reaction functions are linear. Solving for q1 and q2


















(2− sGM − 2 (c+ t) + cGM − 2ρ (1− sGM)) . (6)
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(sGM + (2− sGM) cGM + sGM (c+ t)




((2− sGM) (1 + c+ t) + cGM (8)
−ρ (1− sGM) (4− 2sGM + 3cGM + 2 (c+ t)− 2ρ (1 + cGM))) .
4 Results: The case without contamination
In this section, we present the main results of our model of competition
with mandatory labeling of GM products, focusing on the case without
contamination (ρ = 0). Note that no contamination also means no testing
(so t = 0).11 In the next section we will turn to the effects of contamination
and costly testing. Below, we refer to firm 1, producing the GM product,
as the ‘GM firm’ and to firm 2, producing the conventional product, as the
‘conventional firm’.
Before turning to the results, we first derive in detail the conditions on the
parameters of the model imposed by Assumptions 1 and 2, for the case
ρ = t = 0.12 Assumption 1 ensures that both firms face positive demand in
the general model. Using (1), (2), (7), and (8) and plugging in ρ = t = 0,
11Alternatively, we could interpret the case described in this section as the case where
contamination may occur but this is not tested for, so the conventional product will
never be labeled as GM, and consumers treat the (possibly) contaminated conventional
product as an ordinary conventional product.
12We can ignore the restriction on the parameters imposed by Assumption 3(ii) for
those results that are already unambiguous without this assumption. It turns out that
the results that are ambiguous without Assumption 3(ii) continue to be ambiguous with
this assumption (as shown in the Appendix). Thus, we conclude that Assumption 3(ii)








sGM + (2− sGM) cGM + sGMc
sGM (4− sGM) .
Thus, we can rewrite the condition θ < θˆ < 1 as a condition on cGM , given
by
2c+ sGM − 2 < cGM < 1
2
sGM (1 + c) .
Thus, for ρ = 0 we can rewrite Assumption 1 as follows:
Assumption 4 (Assumption 1 for ρ = 0) In our model without contam-
ination (ρ = 0), both firms face strictly positive demand, that is, parameters
are such that
2c+ sGM − 2 < cGM < 1
2
sGM (1 + c) .
Similarly, we can rewrite Assumption 2 as an assumption on parameters.
Firm 1’s equilibrium profits are given by
pi∗1 =
(sGM (1 + c)− 2cGM)2
(4− sGM)2 sGM
,
and can be shown (using Assumption 4) to be greater than or equal to pi∗B
if the condition in the following assumption is satisfied. Thus, for ρ = 0 we
can rewrite Assumption 2 as follows:
Assumption 5 (Assumption 2 for ρ = 0) In our model without contam-
ination (ρ = 0), if firm 2 produces the conventional version of the product,




(1 + c) sGM − 1
6
(1− c) (4− sGM)√sGM .
13
It can be verified that for any c, sGM ∈ (0, 1) the right-hand side (RHS) of
this expression is in between the two critical values for cGM presented in
Assumption 4, and therefore Assumptions 4 and 5 can be combined into
the condition
2c+ sGM − 2 < cGM ≤ 1
2
(1 + c) sGM − 1
6
(1− c) (4− sGM)√sGM .
Recall that we also assumed 0 < cGM < c.
Now we are ready to derive the main results of the model without contami-
nation. We compare the equilibrium of this model to that of the benchmark
model in order to analyze the effects of the introduction of the GM version
of the product.13,14
Result 1 In our model without contamination (ρ = 0), after the introduc-
tion of the GM product,
1. the output of the GM firm rises relative to the benchmark case;
2. the output of the conventional firm may rise or fall relative to the
benchmark case; it falls whenever the GM product is relatively cheap
to produce;
3. the total output level rises relative to the benchmark case.
13In our analysis, we focus on the size of cGM for given values of the other parameters,
say c and sGM . It would be interesting to focus on sGM instead. This would allow us to
formulate our results in terms of the ‘degree of inferiority’ of the GM product. However,
in particular for our results on profits and welfare, this seriously complicates the analysis.
Nevertheless, one can generally replace ‘cheap (expensive) to produce’ by ‘of high (low)
quality’ in our results and discussion.
14From the proofs of the results, it can be verified that if we simply assume firm 1 to
produce the GM version and firm 2 to produce the conventional version, and ignore the
issue of whether or not this is optimal for the firms (i.e. ignore Assumptions 2 and 3),
all results become ambiguous, except for that on the price of the GM firm.
14
Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, the introduction of the GM product implies that the GM firm
now produces a lower quality at a lower cost. Assumption 2, which states
that it must be profitable for firm 1 to switch to producing the GM version,
requires cGM to be sufficiently low. This results in a higher output level
for firm 1 than in the benchmark model. Also, the low marginal cost cGM
results in higher total output. Further, if marginal cost cGM is very low, the
conventional firm faces stronger competition, which results in lower output
for the conventional firm.
Now consider how the introduction of the GM product affects equilibrium
prices.
Result 2 In our model without contamination (ρ = 0), after the introduc-
tion of the GM product,
1. the price of the GM firm falls relative to the benchmark case;
2. the price of the conventional firm may rise or fall relative to the bench-
mark case; it falls whenever the GM product is relatively cheap to
produce.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Intuitively, the lower marginal cost of the GM firm results in a lower price
for this firm’s product. The introduction of GM products is usually believed
to increase prices of conventional products (see e.g. Lence and Hayes, 2002).
Indeed, this may occur in our model if cGM is relatively high. However, if
cGM is very low, the stronger competition faced by the conventional firm
implies that this firm now receives a lower price for its product as well.
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Another reason for why the price of the conventional product may exceed
the benchmark price may be that the cost of the conventional product is
higher than before due to contamination and costly testing (see the next
section).
We now turn to firm profits.
Result 3 In our model without contamination (ρ = 0), after the introduc-
tion of the GM product,
1. the profit of the GM firm rises relative to the benchmark case (by
Assumption 2);
2. the profit of the conventional firm may rise or fall relative to the
benchmark case; it falls whenever the GM product is relatively cheap
to produce.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The first part of this result is trivial and is presented only for the sake of
completeness. Given the results that the conventional firm’s output and
price may rise or fall, it does not come as a surprise that this firm’s profits
may also rise or fall relative to the benchmark case.
The most important question, of course, is whether the introduction of the
GM product will raise welfare.
Result 4 In our model without contamination (ρ = 0), after the introduc-
tion of the GM product, welfare rises relative to the benchmark case.
16
Proof. In the Appendix.
This result illustrates that under Assumption 2 welfare rises if firm 1
switches to the GM version of the product.15 This is due in part to the
increase in firm 1’s profits. It is therefore interesting to also examine con-
sumer surplus. Are consumers better off in the new situation?
Result 5 In our model without contamination (ρ = 0), after the introduc-
tion of the GM product, consumer surplus may rise or fall relative to the
benchmark case.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Thus, the introduction of the GM version of the product does not neces-
sarily raise consumer surplus.16 This is important, since it is often thought
that the increased choice set benefits consumers. Our results show that
this is not necessarily true if we take into account the effects on competi-
tion, production, and pricing. In particular, if the price of the conventional
product rises relative to the benchmark case, consumers buying the con-
ventional product are worse off than they were before. The same holds for
those consumers who do buy the GM product, but have relatively high θ.
Only those consumers who buy the GM product and have relatively low θ
(some of whom did not buy in the benchmark case) are better off. It turns
out that for some parameter values the negative effect may dominate.
15This is not necessarily true if we ignore Assumption 2; for details see the proof of
the result.
16For the numerical example presented in the next section, Assumption 3(ii) implies
sGM < 0.728. We also require sGM > 0.631. Consumer surplus rises whenever 0.635 <
sGM < 0.728, but falls for 0.631 < sGM < 0.635.
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5 Contamination and testing
In the discussion of the results of our model, we have abstracted from
contamination and the related testing of conventional products. It will be
clear that including these issues seriously complicates the analysis. For
that reason, we will not rephrase the above results in terms of our general
model. Instead, we discuss here what happens if contamination becomes
(more) important, i.e. ρ increases. Initially, we will continue to assume
that t = 0, i.e. testing is costless. Later, we will discuss what happens if
testing becomes more costly, i.e. t increases. Note that we will now use
the term ‘GM product’ to refer to all products labeled as GM, so including
contaminated products produced by firm 2, and the term ‘conventional
product’ for those products produced by firm 2 that have passed the test.
First consider the FOCs (3) and (4), which implicitly define the firms’
reaction functions. Since firm 1’s FOC does not involve ρ, contamination
does not affect this firm’s reaction function. However, firm 2’s reaction
curve will be affected by an increase in ρ. An increase in ρ has two effects.
First, a direct effect: with mandatory labeling, more contamination means
that consumers will consider an increasing fraction of firm 2’s output as
inferior (that is, as equivalent to firm 1’s GM product) and pay a lower
price. Second, an indirect effect: for given output levels of the two firms,
more contamination implies that the output of the GM product is higher
and the output of the conventional product is lower. This implies a lower
price for the GM product but a higher price for the conventional product.
The precise effects of a change in ρ on firm 2’s reaction curve are ambiguous
and depend on which effect dominates. The same is true for the equilibrium
quantities (5) and (6).
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Of course, with respect to contamination we are mainly interested in its
effects on welfare. In itself, contamination has a negative connotation.
Does this imply that contamination always lowers welfare? No, it does not,
as the following result shows.
Result 6 In our model without costly testing (t = 0), welfare may rise or
fall if there is more contamination (ρ increases).
Thus, in our setup increased contamination may actually lead to higher
welfare. We do not present a formal proof for this result, but illustrate





(and t = 0).
Note that the feasible area for sGM derived from Assumptions 1 and 2
now depends on ρ. We do not present these conditions in detail, but note
that for this particular example, for both assumptions to be satisfied for
ρ = 0 we require sGM > 0.631. We let sGM take on the following values:
sGM ∈ { 65100 , 70100 , 75100 , 80100 , 85100 , 90100 , 95100}. Next, we note that for Assumptions















(θs− x) dθ +
∫ 1
θˆ
(θ − c) dθ.
Figure 1 plots welfare as a function of contamination ρ for this numerical
example for 0 ≤ ρ < 6
7
 0.857. From the figure, we can see that in this
example, for relatively low sGM (say, sGM =
65
100
) welfare falls if contami-




increases for low levels of contamination but then decreases for higher levels
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 Contamination ρ 
Welfare W 
sGM = 65/100 
sGM = 70/100 
sGM = 90/100 
sGM = 85/100 
sGM = 80/100 
sGM = 75/100 
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Figure 1: Welfare W as a function of the level of contamination ρ





















of contamination, and for high sGM (say, sGM =
95
100
) welfare increases with
contamination.17
Intuitively, in our setup one of the two firms produces an inferior version of
the product, at lower cost. If for given cost levels this product is of much
lower quality, consumers value the conventional product much higher. The
conventional firm is forced to sell part of its output at a lower price, and
contamination lowers welfare. However, if for given cost levels the quality
17For this example, under Assumption 3(ii) we require sGM < 0.728 and welfare
never increases with contamination. However, it can be verified that welfare may rise
with contamination even under Assumption 3(ii) by considering an alternative numerical








, t = 0, and ρ close to 0.
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of the GM product is not too far below that of the conventional product,18
welfare may increase with contamination (at least if contamination does not
become too serious). This is because the price of the cheaper (GM) version
of the product decreases with contamination, so that more consumers buy
a product.
According to the new EU regulatory framework, if a firm claims its product
to be conventional, the product needs to be tested. In general, such testing
will be costly. So far, we have ignored this in our discussion. It can easily
be seen what happens if we include costly testing in the model. The effect
of this is simply to raise the conventional firm’s marginal cost from c to
c + t. This implies that in equilibrium, the conventional firm now has a
lower output level and the GM firm now has higher output. In our model,
this will unambiguously raise the price of the conventional product. But
the price of the GM product rises as well, as can easily be verified. This is
because the GM firm now faces weaker competition.
Finally, we consider a special case of contamination. In reality, it is to
be expected that the level of contamination depends on the relative output
levels of GM and conventional firms. The more GM products are produced,
the more likely it is that conventional products will become contaminated.
Thus, our parameter ρ may depend on the output levels q1 and q2. For
simplicity, suppose that ρ = q1
q1+q2
, i.e., ρ is equal to the share of the GM
firm’s production in total production. From the FOC of firm 2, (4), it
can be seen that this seriously complicates the analysis. Deriving firm 2’s
reaction function now requires solving a polynomial function of degree 4,
and unfortunately it is not possible to find a closed-form solution for the
18Or, alternatively, if for given cost level c of the conventional product and given
quality sGM of the GM product, the cost of the GM product, cGM , is relatively low.
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equilibrium of the model. We can, however, speculate about the effects
of such an endogenous contamination parameter ρ. If contamination itself
hurts firm 2, then contamination being endogenous may make firm 2 more
aggressive, in the sense that it will produce higher output - which reduces
contamination. This would result in a lower price for the conventional
product, and for the GM product as well (because of stronger competition).
6 Conclusion
We analyzed the effects of the introduction of a GM version of a product on
output, prices, profits, and welfare. We used a duopoly model, where ini-
tially both firms produce exactly the same conventional product, and then
one of the firms switches to producing the GM version, which is of lower
quality but cheaper to produce. Admittedly, our model is highly stylized
and does not describe the introduction of the new legislative framework for
GM organisms by the EU in April 2004 in much detail. For example, GM
products were already allowed - and required to be labeled - to some extent
before that date. Nevertheless, our model yields some interesting results
that may help us understand the potential effects of this new framework.
In general, our results indicated that if the GM firm indeed finds it optimal
to switch to the GM version of the product (and the other firm does not),
then the GM firm’s output rises and its price falls. Total output rises as
well, but the conventional firm’s output, as well as its price and profits, may
rise or fall, depending on parameter values. Social welfare rises unambigu-
ously, although consumer surplus may fall. However, with contamination
— where a fraction of conventionally produced products turns out to be
contaminated and has to be labeled as GM products after all — the results
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may change. In particular, if conventional products have to be tested, then
the cost of testing will drive up the prices of both versions of the product.
Some of our results are rather surprising. With respect to prices, we showed
that the price of the conventional product may well fall after the introduc-
tion of the GM product. This occurs if the GM product is relatively cheap
to produce. In that case, the conventional firm faces stronger competition,
which results in a lower price. Also, we showed that consumer surplus may
fall after the introduction of the GM product. It is often believed that
the larger choice set consumers have with GM products will make them
better off, but this is not necessarily true, as we showed. If the price of
the conventional product is higher than in the benchmark case, the con-
sumers who buy the conventional product are worse off than before, and
consumer surplus may fall. Further, if GM products are of relatively high
quality contamination may actually increase welfare. A final interesting
result from our model is that costly testing will not only raise the price of
the conventional product, as is commonly conjectured, but also that of the
GM product (due to weaker competition).
In the context of the new EU legislative framework, we mention one more
result which can be derived from our model. We showed that whenever
the GM firm indeed finds it optimal to introduce the GM product (i.e.
this firm’s profits rise), social welfare will rise. This suggests that when-
ever firms lobby for or introduce a GM technology, this will lead to higher
welfare. Despite this result, it is not immediately clear how the new reg-
ulatory framework in the EU will affect EU welfare. Although there has
been strong lobbying for the new framework, this was done in particular
by non-EU (mainly United States) firms. Evidently, these firms’ profits
are not taken into account when calculating the EU welfare. So, if GM
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products to be placed on the EU market are for a large part imported
from non-EU countries, the change in EU welfare may be much lower than
the change in overall welfare, and from our model we conclude that either
EU (conventional) producers or EU consumers may be worse off.19 In fact,
one can imagine that for a somewhat different specification of the model, or
when taking into account possible negative environmental or health-related
effects, EU welfare might fall. This illustrates that it is indeed important
for a government to make a thorough ex ante assessment of the costs and
benefits of the introduction of a new GM technology.
Concluding, the costs and benefits of the new EU regulatory framework will
thus depend not only on ethical, health-related, and environmental consid-
erations, and (directly) on the costs and quality of GM products relative
to those of conventional products (including issues like contamination and
costly testing). They also depend on indirect effects due to competitive
considerations and interactions between firms, and the resulting output
decisions, pricing, and entry and exit.
Appendix
Proof of Result 1












4− sGM (2− sGM − 2c+ cGM) .
19In terms of our model, the conventional firm’s profits or consumer surplus may fall;
however, it can be verified that for given parameter values they will not both fall, and
the sum of the two will always rise.
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(1− c) of the conventional product.




sGM (7c+ sGM − sGMc− 1) .
The RHS of this expression is in between the lower and upper bound on
cGM given by Assumption 4 and below c for any feasible values of c and
sGM . Thus, ignoring Assumption 5 we would conclude that q
∗
1  q∗B, where
q∗1 > q
∗
B for cGM relatively small. Now consider Assumption 5. The RHS
derived above is greater than the critical value in Assumption 5 whenever
(4− sGM) (√sGM − sGM) > 0,
which holds true for any 0 < sGM < 1. Thus, taking into account As-
sumption 5, we conclude that q∗1 > q
∗
B. This proves the first item in the
result.




(2c+ 2sGM + sGMc− 2) .
Again, the RHS of the expression is in between the lower and upper bound
on cGM given by Assumption 4 and below c for any feasible values of c
and sGM (but it may be negative). Thus, ignoring Assumption 5 we would
conclude that q∗2  q∗B, where q∗2 > q∗B for cGM relatively large. Now consider
Assumption 5. The RHS derived above is smaller than the critical value in
Assumption 5 whenever
(4− sGM) (√sGM − 1) < 0,
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which holds true for any 0 < sGM < 1. Thus, taking into account As-
sumption 5, we conclude that q∗2  q∗B. Finally, we check Assumption 3(ii).
Equilibrium profits if both firms produce the GM version of the product






sGM , and this assumption can be rewritten as
cGM ≥ sGM − 6 1− c
7− sGM .
The RHS derived above is greater than this critical value derived from
Assumption 3(ii) for any 0 < sGM < 1, so even with this assumption we
find q∗2  q∗B. This proves the second item in the result.
For total output, we have q∗1 + q
∗
2 = Q
∗  Q∗B = 2q∗B if and only if
cGM 
sGM (1 + 5c− sGM − 2sGMc)
3 (2− sGM) .
Again, the RHS of the expression is in between the lower and upper bound
on cGM given by Assumption 4 for any feasible values of c and sGM , and
below c for most feasible values of c and sGM . Ignoring Assumption 5 we
would conclude that Q∗  Q∗B, where Q∗ > Q∗B for cGM relatively small.
Now consider Assumption 5. The RHS derived above is greater than the
critical value in Assumption 5 whenever
sGM − (2− sGM)√sGM < 0,
which holds true for any 0 < sGM < 1. Thus, taking into account As-
sumption 5, we conclude that Q∗ > Q∗B. This proves the third item in the
result.
Proof of Result 2











4− sGM ((2− sGM) (1 + c) + cGM) .
In the benchmark model, we had p∗B =
1
3
(1 + 2c). First consider the price
of firm 1’s GM product. We would have p∗GM  p∗B whenever
cGM 
4 + 8c− 4sGM − 5sGMc
3 (2− sGM) .
It can easily be verified that the RHS of this expression exceeds c. So, for
any feasible parameter values we will have p∗GM < p
∗
B. This proves the first
item in the result.





(2c+ 2sGM + sGMc− 2) .
Note that this is the same condition as we derived in the proof of result
1 for q∗2  q∗B. We immediately conclude that ignoring Assumption 5 we
would have p∗N  p∗B, where p∗N < p∗B for cGM relatively small, and that this
holds true even when taking into account Assumptions 5 and 3(ii). This
proves the second item in the result.
Proof of Result 3
Equilibrium profits in our model with ρ = t = 0 can be calculated as
pi∗1 =




(2 + cGM − 2c− sGM)2
(4− sGM)2
.





Clearly, by Assumption 2 we must have pi∗1 ≥ pi∗B. For completeness, like
we do for the other results, we also discuss here what happens if we ignore
Assumption 2 (or 5), and simply impose that firm 1 produces the GM




(1 + c) sGM − 1
6
(1− c) (4− sGM)√sGM .
The RHS of this expression is in between the lower and upper bound on
cGM given by Assumption 4 for any feasible values of c and sGM and below
c for most feasible values of c and sGM , so if we ignore Assumption 2 (or 5)
we conclude that pi∗1  pi∗B, where pi∗1 > pi∗B for cGM relatively small. In the
proof of Result 1 we rephrased Assumption 3(ii) as a condition on cGM . It
can be shown that the RHS derived above is greater than the critical value
for cGM derived from Assumption 3(ii) whenever
− [3sGM + (4− sGM)√sGM ] (7− sGM) + 36 > 0,
which holds true for any 0 < sGM < 1, so even with this assumption (but
still ignoring Assumption 2 (or 5)) we find pi∗1  pi∗B.




(2c+ 2sGM + sGMc− 2) .
The RHS of this expression is the same as we found above for p∗N  p∗B
and for q∗2  q∗B. We immediately conclude that ignoring Assumption 5 we
would have pi∗2  pi∗B, where pi∗2 > pi∗B for cGM relatively large, and that this
holds true even when taking into account Assumptions 5 and 3(ii). This
proves the second item in the result.
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Proof of Result 4




(θsGM − cGM) dθ +
∫ 1
θˆ
(θ − c) dθ,





12sGM − 5s2GM + s3GM − c2GMsGM − 8cGMsGM
+12c2GM − 2sGM
(
12 + s2GM − 9sGM − cGMsGM + 8cGM
)
c
+sGM (12− sGM) c2
)
.
We would have W ∗ W ∗B whenever
cGM 
1
(12− sGM)(sGM (4 + 8c− sGMc)
−1
3
(1− c) (4− sGM)
√
sGM (sGM + 15)).
The RHS of this expression is in between the lower and upper bound on
cGM given by Assumption 4 and below c for any feasible values of c and
sGM (it may be negative), so ignoring Assumption 5 we would conclude
that W ∗  W ∗B, where W ∗ < W ∗B for cGM relatively large. Now consider




−3sGM + (12− sGM)√sGM − 2
√
sGM (sGM + 15)
)
> 0,
which holds true for any 0 < sGM < 1. Thus, taking into account Assump-
tion 5, we conclude that W ∗ > W ∗B. This proves the result.
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Proof of Result 5




(θsGM − p∗GM) dθ +
∫ 1
θˆ
(θ − p∗N) dθ.
This can be rewritten as
CS∗ =
1




GM − s3GM − 8cGMsGM + 4cGMs2GM
−3c2GMsGM + 4c2GM − 2sGM
(
4− 3sGM + s2GM − cGMsGM
)
c
+sGM (4− 3sGM) c2
)
.












It can be verified that CS∗  CS∗B whenever
cGM 
1
4− 3sGM (sGM (4− 2sGM − sGMc)
−1
3
(1− c) (4− sGM)
√
sGM (7− 3sGM)),
and it can be verified that the RHS of this expression is in between the
lower and upper bound on cGM given by Assumption 4 and below c for any
feasible values of c and sGM (it may be negative). The RHS derived above
















which holds true for any 0 < sGM < 1. Further, it can be shown that the
RHS derived above is greater than the critical value for cGM derived from
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sGM (7− ssGM) + 64− 3sGM
7− sGM > 0,
which holds true for any 0 < sGM < 1. Thus, taking into account As-
sumptions 5 and 3(ii), we conclude that CS∗  CS∗B. This proves the
result.
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